Type XXI U-boats, also known as "Elektroboote", were the first submarines designed to operate entirely submerged, rather than as surface ships that could submerge as a temporary means to escape detection or launch an attack. They were revolutionary when introduced and, if produced earlier and in sufficient quantity, could have seriously influenced the outcome of the Battle of the Atlantic.

The key improvement in the Type XXI was greatly increased b
attery capacity, roughly three times that of the Type VIIC. This gave these boats enormous underwater range, and dramatically reduced the time spent near the surface. They could travel submerged at about five knots (9 km/h) for two or three days before recharging the batteries, which took less than five hours using the snorkel. The Type XXI was also much quieter than the VIIC, making it more difficult to detect when submerged.

The Type XXI's streamlined and hydrodynamically clean hull design allowed high submerged speed. The ability to outrun many surface ships while submerged, combined with improved dive times, made it much harder to chase and destroy. It also gave the boat a 'sprint ability' when positioning itself for an attack. Older boats had to surface to sprint into position. This often gave a boat away, especially after aircraft became available for convoy escort.

The Type XXIs had better facilities than previous classes, including a freezer for foodstuffs. Conveniences for the crew included a shower and a washbasin – crews on other boats spent weeks without bathing or shaving. The Type XXI featured a hydraulic torpedo reloading system that allowed all six torpedo tubes, located in the bow, to be reloaded faster than a Type VIIC could reload a single tube. The Type XXI could fire 18 torpedoes in under 20 minutes. The total warload was 23 torpedoes, or 17 torpedoes and 12 sea mines. The XXI featured an advanced sonar system which allowed aiming torpedoes without using the periscope, increasing stealth.

Between 1943 and 1945, 118 boats of this type were assembled by Blohm & Voss of Hamburg, AG Weser of Bremen, and F. Schichau of Danzig. The hulls were constructed from 8 prefabricated sections with final assembly taking place at the shipyards. This new method could have pushed construction time below six months per vessel, but in reality all the assembled U-boats were plagued with severe quality problems that required extensive post-production work to fix. One of the reasons is that the sections were made by inland companies (result of Albert Speer's decision), even though these had little experience in shipbuilding. The result was that out of 118 assembled XXIs, only four were rated fit for combat before the war ended in Europe.

The Type XXI design directly influenced USS Nautilus, the world's first nuclear submarine, USS Albacore, the first submarine with a teardrop hull, the French Narval class submarine, the British Porpoise class submarine, and the Soviet submarine classes known by the NATO reporting names Zulu and Whiskey, although the Whiskey class was smaller and less sophisticated.


© Geoffrey Brooks 2009


The legend of an inhabited parallel world illuminated by a black sun extends back thousands of years. Exposure to the radiations of this black sun is said to cause temporary insanity and skeletal damage, breeding giants here, dwarves there, forcing the population to live in subterranean tunnels and cave systems to obtain protection. By the late nineteenth century, population size in the parallel world had begun to outstrip the resource of tunnels and caves. Because of the black sun, the society is not industrial, the need for Lebensraum has become urgent, and the obvious solution is to take over the Earth from below.


This idea is the central theme of Sir Edward Bulwer-Lytton’s famous occult novel The Coming Race (London, 1871). The idea recurs in Beasts, Men and Gods (London, 1923, p.313-314) by Ferdinand Ossendowsky. This Polish occultist and explorer reported a visit by the “King of the World”, the emperor of the Underworld, Agharta,  to the Tibetan monastery at Narabanchi near Karakorum, the capital of Genghis Kahn’s empire, in 1890. From the prophecies which he relates one may calculate that after 18 years of wars and cataclysms beginning 2011, “the peoples of Agharta will leave their subterranean caverns and appear on the surface of the Earth”, with the intention of supplanting humanity and taking over. The year for this uprising appears to be 2029.(1)


Here are some “coincidences”: Swastika=symbol for Sun. Black Swastika=symbol for Black Sun. Runic SS=abbreviation for Schwarze Sonne=Black Sun.


Nazism and the Kingdom of Agharta (a part of which is “Thule”) are linked through the Thule Society founded in Germany in 1919. In the fragments which remain of his chronicle On the Ocean, the Greek explorer and navigator Pytheas describes the discovery of the island of Thule “six days’ sail north of the British Isles and one days’ sail south of the pack ice”. This was in about 320 BC. The inhabitants cultivated fruits and grain and kept bees. Since these agricultural activities are impossible within the Arctic Circle, modern historians tend to place Thule much further south, “one day’s sail north of the British Isles and six days’ sail south of the pack ice”, which would put Thule in the Shetlands. If Pytheas was not a complete idiot then the Thule he discovered must be in the parallel world where the climate is ever balmy, “eternal Spring” irrespective of the geographical location. The Press adjutant to Dr Josef Göbbels, Lt.Wilfred von Oven, stated in his book(2) that the Thule of Nazism was the island discovered by Pytheas.


A co-founder of the Thule Society in Germany was Lanz von Liebenfels. In interviews with the Viennese psychologist Wilhelm Daim his biographer, von Liebenfels stated that Thule was believed to be the centre of a lost, high level civilization whose populace had psychic and technological capabilities far in advance of modern mankind. It was the purpose of National Socialism to make a pact with the Underworld people to take over the world in union, and so advance mankind cerebrally. (3)


One might infer from the string of coincidence recited above the desire for a pact in common purpose, but suggested by Agharta to the Nazis, and not the other way around, probably long before the First World War. We may see that Agharta was always the creative and driving force behind Nazism, and Hitler their weird puppet “who danced to their tune”. There is no other way to explain the sudden influx of super-advanced technological ideas which swamped Germany in the second half of the war, particularly in U-boat and aircraft development and explosives. Following Hitler’s defeat, the Third Reich in Exile moved to those impregnable island bases in the parallel world where its designers and builders continued work on marvelous aircraft and submarines such as those which are featured in the remainder of this article. It is rather to be feared that at the right time we shall see these aircraft and vessels for ourselves as they begin to finish the job which “18 years of wars and cataclysms” between the Earth’s nations will shortly begin.


The Golfo Nuevo Incidents in the Second World War


Golfo Nuevo is located on the shores of Chubut province on the 43rd parallel south. The Argentine Navy began to experience the unwelcome presence of what were suspected to be German U-boats around the entrance to Golfo Nuevo prior to 1942 onwards. No explanation has ever been put forward for this activity, and it came back to haunt the Argentines 17 years later.


On 7 March 1942, Capitán Ricardo Lopez Campo commanding the Third Destroyer Division reported that upon entering Golfo Nuevo at 1730 hrs that afternoon, a periscope and wake were seen at 42º55’S 64º01’W, the presence of a submerged submarine being confirmed by his hydrophone station aboard ship.


Later that month, Admiral Sueyro advised the Navy Minister that it was “not the first time he had received reports of this nature for Golfo Nuevo, but spread over different time periods.” This would suggest the presence of unidentified submerged submarines since at least 1941 and perhaps even earlier in the war.


As a result, foreign Governments were warned that “all submarines detected submerged in Argentine waters” would be attacked, and Argentine submarines were ordered to proceed on the surface “to avoid being attacked in error”. There is no record of German U-boats operating in Argentine coastal waters at this stage of the war.


The Incident in Golfo Nuevo, 1958


Golfo Nuevo is an almost enclosed body of water within the Valdez Peninsula on the coast of Chubut province. It is a roundish bay no more than 35 miles across at any point, and from coastal shallows it shelves deeply to a maximum depth of 157 meters at its centre. The entrance faces south-east and is nine miles wide. The town and important naval base – which lacks any facilities for submarines – is located well inshore on the southern side. For the most part the coast has a dune landscape, the soil being layers of bivalve and crustacean fossils, volcanic ash and a clayish sand with gravel. During the winter season it is the haunt of whales, while sea lions can be seen at all times of the year.


During a Press conference at Government House on 23 May 1958, Argentine President Arturo Frondizi made the following announcement:


(1) On Wednesday 21 May a squadron of destroyers carrying out a routine exercise north-west of Cracker Point just inside Golfo Nuevo detected by hydrophones a submarine proceeding submerged. It is assumed that this submarine is capable of high speed underwater.

(2) As is the practice in these cases, being in waters of our national jurisdiction, the destroyers carried out four depth charge patterns.

(3) During the operation a periscope was seen.

(4) After the attacks, patches of oil were found floating on the surface, which often happens when a submarine suffers damage.

(5) Later, our Navy carried out successive searches until Thursday evening, but these were fruitless.

(6) It is therefore assumed that the submarine, though damaged, has eluded its pursuers, or has been sunk.


The exercise was being carried out by three cruisers, four destroyers, a workshop ship, an oceanographic survey ship and a tug, supported by three Catalina aircraft, five bombers, a DC-4 and twelve Corsairs. The submarine was spotted visually from various vantage points on the destroyer Buenos Aires after a radar contact. All depth charges carried by the surface vessels were expended during the initial depth charge patterns.


Late the following week, Navy Secretary contraalmirante Gastón Clement stated that the Navy was continuing its operation in Golfo Nuevo in accordance with a plan drawn up for such emergencies, and with the same intensity as in the opening days of the pursuit. Military sources quoted by the newspapers stated that the submarine had a speed submerged of between eight to twelve knots, and despite the numerous reports positively identifying it as one of a type used by Germany in the Second World War, “the impression amongst the naval chiefs is that these submarines are very much more modern”. The use of the plural “these submarines” when only one had been sighted in Golfo Nuevo is significant, for it confirms our legitimate suspicions that the Argentine Navy knows far more about “these submarines” than it makes out.


By 10 June 1958, nearly three weeks after the operation commenced, the special correspondents sent to Puerto Madryn reported “they suspected that the intruder submarine had escaped through the blockade at the entrance to Golfo Nuevo on 7 June”.


In October 1959, an unidentified submarine was again detected in Golfo Nuevo but left after five days despite a combined air-sea search(4)



The Golfo Nuevo Incident 1960


On the night of 18 January 1960, the Argentine State Yacht Yamana, returning from a survey on the continental shelf, sighted the periscope and tower of a submarine at 45º03’S 64º17’W, off the north end of Golfo San Jorge, Chubut province.


At 1810 hrs on 21 January 1960, the YPF tanker La Plata reported an unidentified submarine heading north at 10 knots at position 43º46’S 63º58’W outside Golfo Nuevo.


In the early hours of 23 January 1960 at position 44º05’S 61º22’W near Golfo Nuevo, a P2V anti-submarine warfare aircraft of the Argentine Navy sighted a grey silhouette moving fast on the surface. There was nobody on the conning tower which was described as having a “tall, narrow sail”.


On 22 January most units of the Sea Flotilla left to investigate this sighting. The Naval Staff was interested in the fact that if this was the same submarine in all sightings, it had made almost no progress anywhere except towards Golfo Nuevo over a period of five days.


At 0820 on 28 January just inside Golfo Nuevo, Task Force 54 consisting of the destroyer Cervantes and patrol boats King and Murature carrying naval cadets on their annual training cruise sighted a periscope trailing a wake and heading for the interior of the gulf. The boats were not equipped with sonar, and the sighting was confirmed by hydrophones. After no response had been received to the demand that the boat surface and identify itself, a depth-charge attack was made. Upon receiving the report, the Naval Staff sent the destroyers Buenos Aires and Santa Cruz, and the anti-submarine frigates Hércules and Sarandí to the location, and put on alert its two P2V Neptune anti-submarine aircraft, which carried better electronic detection equipment than the surface vessels.  The Navy Secretary decided not to announce the incident to the general public until the situation had become clearer, but the Chief of the Naval General Staff contacted the US naval attaché and asked if the United States would be prepared to offer any kind of advanced anti-submarine weaponry.


The Cervantes meanwhile was patrolling the nine-mile wide entrance to Golfo Nuevo while the two patrol boats worked as a pair searching for the submarine. With the arrival of the two frigates and two destroyers, the Task Force now consisted of seven ships and was renumbered 86, being formed into three pairs plus Cervantes at the entrance. The minelayers Granville and Py left Bahía Blanca with a cargo of mines. The coastal lights at the gulf entrance were extinguished. When a contact was made at Punta Conscriptos along the southern shore, Hércules and Sarandí made a depth charge attack but were surprised when the submarine slipped away at 12 knots heading for the gulf entrance where the thermal layers offered poor audibility.


The national newspaper La Nacíon was the first to report the incident to the public in its edition of 2 February 1960: “The Navy has sent a number of units in search of a submerged object detected last Saturday in waters of Argentine jurisdiction”, and on 3 February Navy Secretary Gastón Clement announced that other ships were being sent. He considered it probable that there were two submarines “because these boats generally operate in pairs”. This statement shows once more that far more is known about the submarines making these incursions than the Argentine Navy and Government admits. This was the fourth submarine incursion in less than a year, and by now no doubt the Argentines had a fair idea of the capabilities and modus operandi of the submarines involved, as the incident late that night proved.


Near Punta Cracker at the entrance to the gulf, the destroyer San Luis obtained a submarine contact at 3000 yards moving at 15 knots through the 50-metres shallows. When the sea was illuminated by the Leigh light of a P2V circling overhead, a slim grey periscope was seen. Two rounds were fired from the deck gun, forcing the submarine to submerge. As the depth charge attack was being prepared aboard the sister destroyer Buenos Aires, the submarine arrived directly beneath her keel. When the rudder was put hard over, the submarine copied the manouevre. This demonstrated that the submarine could make a very tight circle. At this point it released an Alka-Seltzer, a capsule which developed tumescence in the sea to baffle shipboard detection devices, and ran off at high speed submerged.


On 4 February after hours of continuous attacks, San Luis and Santa Cruz had exhausted their issue of depth charges and returned to Puerto Madryn to reload, leaving the patrol boats King and Murature to hold the field. They made sporadic attacks, never sure of the target, and then decided to attempt a ploy. The two patrol boats sailed close together, each using only one propeller. When approximately overhead of the submarine, Murature cut her engine while King made a few simulated sweeps on both engines before vacating the area. The purpose of this manouvre was to deceive the submarine commander into believing he was alone. Now that Murature could be certain that the submarine was directly below her keel, she moved ahead quickly, firing one depth charge from the stern tube and six from the lateral tubes. This ruse looked successful, for after the explosions died down iridescent patches of oil were found on the surface, but as Mutature approached, the submarine headed for the gulf entrance at high speed to obtain the protection of the poor audibility there. This was due to the respective temperatures of the water layers and the fast current there which resembled the conditions at Gibraltar well known to wartime U-boat commanders.


On 5 February, the commander of Task Force 86 signaled Commander Naval Operations that his depth charges were not able to damage the intruder “due to limits on depth”. Argentine depth charges were ineffective below 150 feet, and if the intruder knew this, it could escape all depth charge attacks by going deeper. His sonars were also of limited usefulness because of the submarine’s high speed. They had a short range, did not function when the carrier ship moved faster than 18 knots nor provide the depth of the target. It was therefore essential that better quality equipment was introduced in the hunt or the outlook was “not promising”. In particular homing torpedoes were needed. These were equipped with inbuilt sonar guidance system and were virtually infallible, but the nations which had been approached were not keen on supplying to Argentina weaponry still on their secret lists. Instead 100 depth charges and the technicians to install MAD equipment aboard the P2V aircraft were dispatched. The MAD system was based on an analysis of the change in the vertical magnetic component of the waters produced by the presence of a metal submergible.


The Naval Staff was concerned that so far the intruder submarine was running the operation. Over the previous five days there had been contacts which led to attacks, but the submarine had never been pinpointed and tracked in the normal manner. At night hundreds of flares lit the sky while ships’ searchlights swept the waters and the depth charges crashed and thundered. By 10 February the anti-submarine corvette La Republica arrived with replacements including many experienced sonar operators, followed next day by the destroyer Entre Ríos and the frigate Santísima Trinidad, but the decision was taken not to mine the gulf entrance. On 12 February the tanker Punta Médanos anchored off Punta Pirámide to enable swifter refuelling.


On 13 February the Spanish periodical Las Provincias published a cable from its correspondent William Horsey in which he reported that the submarine in Golfo Nuevo had “surfaced briefly on seven occasions and had been positively identified as a Type XXI German U-boat of the Second World War”. In unconfirmed reports, oil samples which the boat had leaked had been analyzed and were alleged to be an oil of the kind produced to a Third Reich formula at the end of the war.


The previous day La Nación quoted military sources that the submarine “had the profile of a Type XXI German U-boat” and President Frondizi order an all-out attack. He had thirteen warships and forty aircraft available, and on 13 February modern depth-charges, flares, sonar buoys and other advanced weaponry and equipment arrived from the United States together with anti-submarine veterans. These were led by Captain Ray Pitts USN, who reported directly to almirante Rega, Commander Argentine Naval Operations. The depth charges were of terrific destructive effect and could destroy a submarine down to 200 meters, which was deeper than any point in Golfo Nuevo. The P2V aircraft each had two homing torpedoes below the wings and MAD search equipment fitted. All this should have been sufficient to destroy a single submarine in a round gulf no more than 35 miles across.


On 14 February, reported in full by La Prensa two days later, the Argentine Foreign Ministry had sent a Note to all nations known to operate submarines asking that “if the submarine of unknown flag in waters of our national jurisdiction at Golfo Nuevo, Chubut province, is a submarine of your State” would the naval attaché be so kind as to “ask your Government to issue instructions to the submarine in question to identify itself to the naval authority of the zone” since the Argentine Government now considered itself “legitimately authorized to take those steps it deems necessary to uphold the law with respect to the territorial sovereignty of the Republic.”


The Soviet naval attaché to Argentina, Kourin, and Vice-President Mikoyan both denied that the submarine was Russian. The formal denial of the Soviet Government was reinforced over the next few days when the USSR made no diplomatic attempts to enable the submarine to extract itself. Mikoyan also made the comment that from what he had seen so far, all the Argentines were likely to kill in Golfo Nuevo was “a heap of fish”. Argentine newspapers also disclosed from unofficial sources that the submarine had replied with a negative statement.


The newspaper La Razón, under a headline Destruction of Enemy Submarine in Golfo Nuevo Imminent, reported on 14 February:


The Navy Secretary Gastón Clement announced last night in response to a question regarding the inordinate delay in destroying the enemy submarine in the South, that he thought it was “fundamentally a matter of hours”. He reiterated that there were two submarines present and one of them was presumed to have propeller damage, judging by the noises picked up by the hydrophones. These were submergibles which possessed very advanced equipment. For example, when submarines of this type suspect they are being tracked by sonar, they use a special ray to destroy the precision of the instrumentation... 


La Razón also ran an article under the banner Body Appears at Puerto Madryn:


An unconfirmed report states that the body of a frogman-diver has been found near Punta Ninfas just inside Golfo Nuevo. By the state of decomposition it is thought the man has been dead four days. Until now he had not been identified. The frogman suit is of standard design and two oxygen tanks were found. No manufacturer’s labels or marks were found on the clothing or equipment. The body has injuries leading to a belief that the man may have been a crew member of the damaged submarine killed due to the effects of blast while attempting to make repairs.


On 14 February two strange submarines arrived and manoeuvred near the Argentine flotilla outside territorial waters. These submarines were described as “gigantic” and the type “could not be determined with exactitude”. Inside Golfo Nuevo, the depth charging with the new, extremely powerful explosives began. One depth charge was dropped every ten minutes day and night. Naval forces reported that the intruder had the “mysterious ability to elude electronic detection”, and on 15 February the Argentine Minister of Defence, Justo Vilar, announced that in his opinion “the submarine must have escaped”. The same day La Nación reported from a communiqué from Washington whereby


...the US Navy has sent a team of thirteen anti-submarine experts to help the Argentine Navy in its hunt for the submarines in Golfo Nuevo. Their assistance will be purely advisory. The Navy also confirmed that additional anti-submarine material has been dispatched south. A cargo of depth charges, sonar buoys, sonar and electronic detection equipment were sent to Argentina last week.


In its editorial of 16 February 1960, La Nación stated:


The general anxiety to know the true situation regarding the events in Golfo Nuevo is growing rapidly in the face of reports that the submarine bottled up by Argentine warships had slipped through the net and left. However, naval circles maintain that there may yet be a favourable outcome to the matter, especially after the Navy Secretary confirmed that the patrols will continue to intensify. 


 La Nación was not so sure that the submarine had not escaped:


As advised in previous reports, the possibility is not being discounted that the submarine has fled. It had recently become much more manouevrable, and was faster than at any time during the first 17 days in Golfo Nuevo. If it could make 20 knots submerged, as appears likely, it would not be difficult for it to mock its pursuers. To support this conclusion one thinks of our frigates, unable to manage 18 knots, and of our destroyers whose radars go fuzzy when the ship goes faster than 15 to 17 knots...


At the invitation of the Navy Secretary, a senator and congressman flew down to Puerto Madryn to be updated on Navy operations “against the submarine of unknown flag detected in the waters of Golfo Nuevo”.


On 17 February King and Murature in Golfo Nuevo re-established contact with the submarine, and the biggest naval-air concentration since the Second World War gathered in the small gulf for a fresh onslaught.


On 18 February La Prensa was not optimistic about a successful conclusion being achieved:


There have been no new developments in the search for the submarines in Golfo Nuevo. The lack of fresh contact with the intruders, and the prolonged nature of the operation, has led people to speculate that the submarines have fled. This hypothesis, and the other to the effect that they have been sunk, is not supported by concrete facts or claims...


In the early hours of 21 February when a Type XXI submarine surfaced, homing torpedoes were fired but these “incomprehensibly missed”. A fresh salvo also missed, and more sonar torpedoes fired from the air were also unsuccessful. No report was issued on whether the torpedoes were deflected away from the target or appeared to go through it(5).


On 22 February when the submarine surfaced briefly to discharge oil it was shelled by warships but no hits were observed. By now the Argentine Navy had had enough and on 23 February reported:


The waters of Golfo Nuevo were carefully combed on 21 and 22 February without any further contact being made with the intruder, and it is believed to have escaped. It is presumed however that it may attempt to return. Nevertheless the search has been stepped down...


On 22 March 1960 the New York Times published the following article under the caption Submarine Held Real – Leader of US Unit Backs Argentine Report:


Washington, 21 March (UP)

Captain Ray M Pitts, who headed a US unit in Argentina during last month’s submarine scare, believes there was a foreign submarine in Golfo Nuevo. He said in an interview that there was much evidence he was not free to speak about. He added that he had talked with persons who said they had seen the intruder. He said he was confident those persons were telling the truth.

Captain Pitts is Assistant Director of the Navy’s undersea warfare division. Eight of the 13-man US expedition sent to Argentina to help hunt for the submarne were killed in the plane collision on 25 February over Rio de Janeiro.”


On 24 February 1960 the Argentine Secretary of the Navy announced:


The operation in Golfo Nuevo has ended without the capture or destruction of the intruder submarines. However, the Navy has fulfilled its duty, which is in essence to protect our sovereignty at sea and along the littoral and river coasts, on the surface, below it and in the air above. Its duty was done in effect, since it detected the intruder, attacked it offering no quarter, forced it to vacate our waters and prevented it from carrying out its mission, which was to violate our national sovereignty...


This platitude glosses over the fact that the Argentine Navy and its surface ships were never sure of where the intruder was at any material time, could not locate it with electronic equipment and could not sink it with torpedoes, depth charges or shelling from the sea or air. According to the US Navy anti-submarine warfare veterans they abandoned the field with the intruder still in charge: if the submarine had been of malevolent intent it would have sunk the lot of them.


As to the intruder, the Argentine Navy Secretary thought that the submarine was fitted with some kind of ray which neutralized sonar and radar beams and the MAD analyzer. That may have been true, and the same ray might also have jammed the electronics of the advanced torpedoes too. Yet no ray can explain the failure of the explosives, particularly those of terrific destructive effect, to destroy the boat. The submarine crew would never have remained in Golfo Nuevo had there been a real risk that the boat could have been sunk. Therefore it is fair to conclude that the boat was actually invulnerable to attack when it needed to be. This might mean it could move between this world and the parallel world which interpenetrates our world.


Whatever the origin of the Type XXI U-boats in Golfo Nuevo, the case brings to light the relationship existing between UFOs at sea or in the air and the technology developed by Germany during the Second World War. The scientific and technical materials, and the specialists to work them, were transported to Argentina, and after a decade or so there began to appear mysterious U-boats with strange capabilities which are dismissed nowadays as UFOs by people who do not believe in UFOs. Meanwhile the Governments of the world, “victorious” in 1945, are forced to recognize their impotence against this new U-boat Arm.




(1)Cardinal Ratzinger drew attention to a code secreted in the 20th century apparitions of the Virgin Mary. When decrypted, this code also indicates the final year for humanity as it exists as being 2029.

(2)Von Oven, Wilfred, (Göbbels’ Press adjutant): Con paso firme y pausado, Galland Books, 2008, p.45: translated from the original 1998 German version, Mit ruhig festem Schritt, the autobiography of an SA man.

(3)Daim, Professor Wilfried, Der Mann der Hitler die Ideen gab, Munich, 1985.

(4)Blanco y Negro, Madrid, No.2494, 20 February 1960.

(5)The sources for this account were Camarasa, Jorge, Puerto Seguro, Norma Books, Buenos Aires, 2006 and the website www.editorialbitacora.com/armagedon/golfonuevo/golgonuevo.htm, but primarily Schwarz, Captain Jorge F. (ret’d), Operación Golfo Nuevo, Instituto de Publicaciones Navales, Buenos Aires, 2002. An officer of the Argentine Navy communications branch, at the time of the 1960 incident Captain Schwarz was attached to the Secretaría General Naval which allowed him the opportunity to gather the basic material necessary to reconstruct events and interview naval and air force crews. His account finishes at 14 February 1960 before the introduction of the advanced weaponry from the United States, for reasons of national security and secrecy.